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Abstract 
 
After the global crisis, one of the most important lessons learned for the Central Banks has 
appeared to be the vital importance of financial stability along with the price stability. Hence, 
finding solutions to how to incorporate the financial stability objective in the implementation 
of the monetary policy without diluting the price-stability objective has started to be heavily 
discussed by the academics and policy makers. Accordingly, it has started to be debated that 
using only short-term interest rates as the main policy tool may not be enough to maintain the 
price stability and the financial stability at the same time. Interest rates that provide price 
stability and financial stability can be different and this necessitates the central banks to use 
multiple policy tools. In view of this, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey adopted a 
new monetary policy framework called the new policy mix in which multiple tools are 
employed to achieve multiple objectives. In this framework, required reserves ratios, weekly 
repo rates, interest rate corridor, funding strategy and other macro prudential tools are jointly 
used as complementary tools for the credit, interest rate and liquidity policies to achieve the 
price and the financial stability objectives concurrently. This new monetary policy adopted in 
Turkey also provides an interesting case study to assess how a country came up with novel 
policies to account for its country specific characteristics.  
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Central Banking in Making during the Post-crisis World and the Policy-Mix of 
the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
1. Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis began to affect both developed and developing countries 
starting with the last quarter of 2008. All countries in a coordinated way have adopted a new 
set of monetary and fiscal policies in order to alleviate the harmful effects of the global 
financial crisis for their economies. After the most intense episode of the global financial 
crisis, the difference in the growth recovery rates between the developed and developing 
economies has been widened especially in 2010. The recovery in the economic activity in the 
advanced countries has been limited since the firms and households in these countries have 
continued the process of deleveraging and also there has been a slow recovery in their labor 
markets. On the other hand, a healthy financial structure and lower levels of household debt 
have led a much more rapid recovery in the developing countries in the post-crisis period. 
This situation has, however, instigated the continuation of monetary expansion in the 
advanced economies, while leading to the withdrawal of the measures taken during the crisis 
in the developing countries as well as intensifying the search by the policy makers of the 
developing countries for the alternative policies to prevent the undesirable side effects of the 
global monetary expansion.  
Following the introductory part, the rest of the paper is organized as follows: the 
discussion about how the central banking has changed after the crisis is presented in the 
second part.  The new policy mix of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) that 
is the new monetary policy framework adopted in Turkey in response to the post-crisis 
environment of the global financial markets is explained in the third section. The final part 
concludes the paper.  
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2. Central Banking in Making during the Post-crisis World  
 
Since the period of Great Moderation has ended up with the global crisis, maintaining a 
low and stable inflation does not guarantee a macroeconomic stability in general and the 
financial stability in particular (Borio 2011). After the crisis, one of the most important 
lessons learned for the Central Banks has appeared to be the vital importance of financial 
stability along with the price stability. Hence, finding solutions to how to incorporate the 
financial stability objective in the implementation of monetary policy without diluting the 
price-stability objective has started to be heavily discussed by the academics and the policy 
makers. Given that these discussions are very likely to continue in the foreseeable future, 
Goodhart (2010) states that the years ahead will be a period of experimentation in the central 
banking. 
Before the crisis, it was generally agreed that the monetary policy should take care of 
the price stability while the regulation and supervision should take care of the financial 
stability. In other words, the micro prudential regulation of the financial sector was considered 
to be adequate without necessitating any need for a macro prudential regulation of the 
financial sector.  However, the global crisis has revealed that soundness of each and every 
individual financial institution is not enough for the stability of financial system and there is a 
need for a macroprudential perspective before the crisis erupts (Borio 2011). Brunnermeier et 
al. (2009) rightly argues that the central banks play a key role in this new macroprudential 
orientation. After the global financial crisis, the idea that the central banks should contribute 
to the financial stability while maintaining the price stability, is gaining more ground. In this 
context, using only short-term interest rates as the main policy tool may not be enough to 
maintain the price stability and contribute to the financial stability at the same time. The 
interest rate to provide the price stability and the interest rate to contribute to the financial 
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stability can be quite different for an extended period of time thereby requiring the central 
banks to use multiple policy tools to achieve the price stability and the financial stability 
objectives conjointly. 
Bean (2009) argues that the financial stability is best ensured through the newly 
established macroprudential frameworks. On the other hand, Shirakawa (2010) and Bloxham 
et al. (2010) claim that macroprudential frameworks can help for the financial stability but 
they are not adequate since the role of monetary policy is simply too important. After Lehman 
Brothers’ collapse, the central banks throughout the world started to aggressively reduce their 
policy interest rates and the interest rates hit the zero lower bound especially in the advanced 
developed countries. However, these reductions have not been enough for the economic 
recovery. Hence, the central banks in the advanced countries started to resort to a new set of 
unconventional monetary policies like the large-scale purchases of government and private 
sector assets. This unusual balance-sheet policy has maintained due to the zero lower bound 
dilemma of the interest rates. However, the concern has started to arise overtime about this 
accommodative policy stance since it would be very difficult to use exit strategies as the 
duration of unconventional policies prolongs. In this sense for example, Adrian and Shin 
(2010) shows that the low interest rates may encourage excessive risk-taking which makes it 
more difficult to reverse the initial accommodative policies adopted . 
Before the crisis, it was argued that if each central bank keeps its house in order, there 
would be a proper global monetary stance. Rose (2007) argues that all central banks need to 
do is to ensure price stability in their own economy and let the exchange rate float. However, 
Padoa-Schioppa (2008) claims that the common view that keeping one’s house in order is 
sufficient for the global stability need to be reconsidered. After the crisis, the idea that is 
gaining more ground is that there needs to be a close cooperation between the central banks 
for the global macroeconomic and financial stability. Consequently, the large-country central 
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banks need to pay more attention to their collective policy stance and its global implications 
and furthermore they should be ready to implement a coordinated action to help stabilize the 
global economy in times of stress.            
3. Policy-Mix of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey  
 
Expansionary monetary policies by the advanced countries had significant 
implications for the Turkish economy since the availability of ample and low-cost short-term 
foreign financing led to a rapid credit expansion and deterioration of the current account 
(Figure 1). The appreciation in the Turkish lira and the increase in the domestic consumption 
accelerated the import growth while the weak foreign demand in the aftermath of the crisis led 
to a moderate increase in the export growth. Consequently, the deterioration in the current 
account and the surge in the share of short-term capital inflows amplified the vulnerability of 
the Turkish economy to the vagaries in the global risk appetite. Hence, under these 
circumstances, the implementation of a new policy mix was inevitable (Figure 2).  
(Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here) 
In this new policy mix, while maintaining the price stability is certainly the primary 
goal of the CBRT while contributing to the financial stability becomes a supportive objective 
in the monetary policy framework. In this framework, multiple instruments are  employed to 
achieve the multiple objectives; the price stability and the financial stability. Reserve 
requirements and other macro-prudential tools are used for the credit policy, weekly repo rate 
is used for the interest rate policy and finally the interest rate corridor and the funding strategy 
are used for the liquidity policy. In utilizing these tools, expectations, credit growth and 
exchange rate are monitored as key indicators for the price and financial stability (Scheme 1).  
For instance, the reference rate of 15 percent annual credit growth is set and closely 
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monitored by CBRT to ensure a balanced demand and a more controlled growth. Moreover, 
the reference point of 120 in real effective exchange rate is also announced in order to give 
indication to the market as to whether there is an excessive appreciation pressure on the 
Turkish lira. These newly formulated unconventional policies are used in Turkey to maintain 
the financial stability without forgoing the primary objective of price stability.  
(Insert Scheme 1) 
In the period of November 2010-August 2011, the global risk appetite was strong and 
therefore there was a high short-term capital inflow to the emerging markets. During this 
period, the CBRT aimed to channel the capital inflows for longer term investments and to 
prevent the excessive appreciation of the Turkish lira emanating from the short-term portfolio 
inflows. (Başçı and Kara, 2011; Akçelik et al., 2013). Moreover, the CBRT targeted a more 
controlled growth of domestic demand and credit growth in order to rebalance the domestic 
demand and foreign demand. In November 2010, the CBRT decreased the overnight 
borrowing rate 400 basis points from 5.75 percent to 1.75 percent while keeping the lending 
rate at 8.75 percent and the policy rate at 7.00 percent.  
In December 2010, the overnight borrowing rate was lowered to 1.50 percent and the 
overnight lending rate was raised to 9.00 percent. Thus, the interest rate corridor was widened 
further and the difference between the lending and the borrowing rate became 750 basis 
points. The policy rate was reduced to 6.50 percent in December 2010, and later reduced to 
6.25 percent in January 2011. These interest rates were kept unchanged until August 2011. 
During this period, the overnight interest rates were allowed to materialize significantly below 
the policy rate so that short term carry trade was discouraged by reducing the return to risk 
ratio (Figure 3). In the same period, the reserve requirement ratios were also increased to 
prevent the excessive credit growth and to control the domestic demand. Moreover, after 
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November 2010, the movement of the Turkish lira against the U.S. dollar was clearly 
differentiated relative to the currencies of other developing countries. While the Turkish lira 
was depreciated by a policy induced move, the currencies of other developing countries 
appreciated against the U.S dollar (Figure 4). Furthermore, the share of the long-term capital 
inflows began to increase during this period (Figure 5). 
(Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4 here)  
In the period of August 2011-June 2012, the concerns regarding the public debt issues 
in some European countries had resulted in an escalation of global risk aversion. Thus, the 
capital outflows started to take place away from the developing countries. Since the CBRT 
had ample room for maneuvers due to the earlier proactive policy actions taken, the CBRT 
started to use the policy tools in the opposite direction. In response to the deterioration in the 
global risk appetite, the CBRT increased the overnight borrowing interest rate from 1.50 
percent to 5.00 percent and reduced the policy rate from 6.25 percent to 5.75 percent while 
keeping the overnight lending rate at 9.00 percent. Thus, the interest rate corridor was 
narrowed in August 2011. In October 2011, in order to prevent the adverse effects of the 
Eurozone debt crisis on the medium-term inflation expectations and outlook, the CBRT 
increased the overnight lending rate by 350 basis points to 12.50 percent while keeping the 
overnight borrowing interest rate constant. Accordingly, the interest rate corridor was 
widened upward and the difference between the overnight lending and borrowing became 750 
basis points. In addition, the Turkish lira reserve requirements were reduced to alleviate the 
liquidity requirement of the banking sector. With the help of upward interest rate corridor, the 
overnight interest rates were realized to be close to the overnight lending rate of the CBRT 
(Figure 6).  
(Insert Figure 5 and Figure 6 here) 
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As a pillar of the new policy mix, the overnight interest rates are adjusted according to 
the course of economic and financial developments without changing the weekly repo rates, 
i.e. the policy rate (Başçı, 2011). Accordingly, the CBRT has occasionally delivered an 
additional monetary tightening as needed in order to prevent the temporary price movements 
from deteriorating the inflation outlook via expectations. During the days of an additional 
monetary tightening, as a part of the active liquidity policy, reduced funding or even no 
funding is supplied via the quantity auction method. Instead, the market is funded via the 
traditional auction method, and thereby the policy rates settle close to the upper bound of the 
interest rate corridor. The additional monetary tightening had been delivered 6 times during 
this period. Akçelik et al. (2012) empirically show that the additional monetary tightening 
policy had a significant impact in reducing the volatility in the exchange rate of the Turkish 
lira and they also document that the Turkish lira even appreciated against the emerging 
market currencies during the days of additional monetary tightening. As a result of the 
proactive and timely unconventional monetary policies implemented in this period, the share 
of long-term capital inflows in financing the current account deficit started to accelerate 
gradually and this share became even larger than the share of short-term capital inflows for 
the first time in October 2011 (Figure 7). Finally, from the second quarter of 2011, the real 
imports started to decline and the real exports began to rise thereby allowing the rebalancing 
to take place in the Turkish economy (Figure 8). 
(Insert Figure 7 and Figure 8 here) 
As a result of the measures taken in the Euro area, the global risk appetite has later 
improved.  Not surprisingly, the resurge in the short term capital flows to the emerging 
markets has accelerated since June 2012. Furthermore, the risk perception towards Turkish 
economy has improved thanks to the better-than-expected outturns in the inflation and current 
account. Accordingly, the CBRT has reduced its average funding rate gradually and 
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subsequently the market overnight interest rate declined (Figure 9). There have been clearer 
signs of a more robust rebalancing process on the current account and a better composition of 
growth (Figure 10).  
(Insert Figure 9 and Figure 10 here) 
The disinflationary impact of the domestic demand has also become more prevalent 
and hence the inflation has started to decline (Figure 11). In September 2012, the CBRT 
decreased the overnight lending rate from 11.50 percent to 10.00 percent while maintaining 
the overnight borrowing interest rate and the policy rate at their existing levels. The overnight 
lending rate was reduced 50 basis points once in October and once more in November 2012. 
Therefore, the interest rate corridor was narrowed further. Then, the policy rate was reduced 
25 basis points in December 2012. The overnight lending and borrowing rate of CBRT were 
reduced 25 basis points both in January and February 2013. In March 2013, the lending rate 
has been cut 100 basis points and this made interest corridor more symmetric. In April 2013, 
the policy, lending and borrowing rates were reduced 50 basis points in order to keep interest 
rates lower under the global financial conditions.  Currently, the CBRT’s the overnight 
lending rate is 7.00 percent; the borrowing rate is 4.00 percent and the policy rate is 5 percent 
(Figure 12). 
(Insert Figure 11 and Figure 12 here) 
Meanwhile, the CBRT has adopted a new policy mechanism called the Reserve 
Option Mechanism (ROM) that aims to increase the resilience of the financial stability in 
Turkey. ROM gives an option to the Turkish banks to hold FX or gold reserves instead of a 
certain fraction of Turkish lira reserve requirements.  This mechanism is expected to smooth 
the imbalances between FX demand and supply due to shifts in the capital flow movements 
(Alper et al., 2012). The ROM mechanism has been constructed over time. At first, the upper 
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limit for the FX reserves that might be held to maintain the Turkish lira reserve requirements 
was set to 10 percent in September 2011 and then it was increased gradually to 40 percent. In 
May 2012, the reserve option coefficient (ROC) was introduced and the upper limit of the 
above-mentioned facility has been raised to 45 percent, and the banks are allowed to hold the 
Turkish lira reserve requirements in FX over the total amount calculated by multiplying the 
first tranche corresponding to 40 percent of Turkish lira reserve requirements by a ROC of 
“1”, as previously, and the second tranche corresponding to 5 percent of Turkish lira reserve 
requirements multiplied by a ROC of “1.4”. The upper limit of the above-mentioned facility 
has been raised to 60 percent in August 2012. After having been revised a number of times, 
currently the ROCs are accordingly: for the first 35 percent: 1.4, between 35-40 percent: 1.7, 
between 40-45 percent: 2.1, between 45-50 percent: 2.4, between 50-55 percent: 2.6 and 
between 55-60 percent: 2.7 (Figure 13).  
Similarly, the upper limit for gold reserves that might be held to maintain Turkish lira 
reserve requirements was set 10 percent in November 2011 and then it was increased 
gradually to 30 percent. As of April 2012, the ROCs for the gold are determined for the first 
15 percent: 1.4, between 15-20 percent: 1.5, between 20-25 percent: 2.0 and between 25-30 
percent: 2.5 (Figure 14).  
(Insert Figure 13 and Figure 14 here) 
This new facility not only provides the Turkish lira liquidity to the banks in a more 
permanent way and lowers their cost, but also supports the CBRT’s foreign exchange and 
gold reserves (Figure 15 and Figure 16). The ROM is designed to operate as an automatic 
stabilizer for the variations in the capital flows and has increased the flexibility of Turkish 
monetary policy. Oduncu et al. (2013) empirically analyze the effectiveness of ROM in 
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decreasing the volatility of Turkish lira and they find that that the ROM is statically 
significant in reducing the exchange rate volatility. 
(Insert Figure 15 and Figure 16 here) 
4. Conclusion 
 
After the global financial crisis, it was well understood by the academics and the 
policy makers that the price stability is not sufficient for maintaining the macroeconomic 
stability and the financial stability is essential for the well-functioning of the domestic and the 
global financial markets. Therefore, finding a solution on how to incorporate the financial 
stability objective into the implementation of the monetary policy without diluting the price-
stability objective has become a pressing concern for the central bank authorities. The CBRT 
adopted a new monetary policy framework called the policy mix since November 2010 in 
order to offer a country-specific solution to this concern.  
In this policy mix, the required reserves and other macro prudential tools like the 
weekly repo rates, interest rate corridor and funding strategy are jointly used as the 
complementary tools for the credit policy, interest rate policy and liquidity policy. In utilizing 
these tools, the expectations, credit growth and exchange rate are monitored as the key 
indicators for the price and financial stability (Başçı, 2012). Moreover, the Reserve Option 
Mechanism, that is the option to hold FX or gold reserves in increasing amounts in place of 
the Turkish Lira reserve requirements of Turkish banks, was introduced during the same 
period. It is aimed to increase the resilience of the financial system against the external shocks 
through increasing international reserves of the banking system held within the Central Bank 
and to give more flexibility to the monetary policy through separate management of domestic 
and foreign liquidity. In conclusion, it is believed that the discussion of the post-crisis central 
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banking and the CBRT’s experience with the policy mix will be helpful for the academics, 
economists in practice and the central bank authorities when they all are currently treading in 
the uncharted waters of the new global financial system.    
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Figure-I 
Current Account Deficit & Credit Growth 
(*12-month cumulative, Percent) 
Figure-II 
Sources of External Finance 
(12-month cumulative, Billion USD) 
  
Source: CBRT, Turkstat. Source: CBRT. 
 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Current Account Deficit* /GDP 
Change in Credi Stock/GDP  (r.h.s) 
 
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70 FDI and Long-term 
Portfolio and 
Short-term 
17 
 
Figure-III 
Monetary Policy & Interest Rates 
(Daily, Percent) 
Figure-IV 
TL and Emerging Market Currencies 
(Daily, 01.11.2010=1) 
  
Source: CBRT, ISE. Source: Bloomberg. 
EM Average:  Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, South Africa, South Korea 
and Thailand. 
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Figure-V 
Sources of External Finance 
(12-month cumulative, Billion USD) 
Figure-VI 
Monetary Policy & Interest Rates 
(Daily, Percent) 
  
Source: CBRT. Source: CBRT. 
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Figure-VII 
Sources of External Finance 
(12-month cumulative, Billion USD) 
Figure-VIII 
Exports and Imports Index 
(Seasonally Adjusted, Quarterly, 2003=100) 
  
Source: CBRT. Source: CBRT, Turkstat. 
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Figure-IX 
CBRT Average Funding and ISE O/N Rates 
(Daily, Percent) 
Figure-X 
Current Account Deficit 
(12-Month Cumulative, Billion USD) 
  
Source: CBRT. Source: CBRT. 
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Figure-XI 
Inflation 
(Percent) 
Figure-XII 
Monetary Policy & Interest Rates 
(Daily, Percent) 
  
Source: Turkstat. Source: CBRT. 
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Figure-XIII 
Reserve Options Mechanism (FX) 
 
Figure-XIV 
Reserve Options Mechanism (Gold) 
  
Source: CBRT. Source: CBRT. 
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Figure-XV 
FX Reserves (Gold included)  
(Million USD) 
Figure-XVI 
Gold Reserves  
(Million USD) 
  
Source: CBRT. Source: CBRT. 
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